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NOBODY PUTS BLOCKCHAIN IN A
CORNER: THE DISRUPTIVE ROLE OF
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY IN THE
FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY AND
CURRENT REGULATORY ISSUES
Elizabeth Sara Ross †

“Technology changes. Economy laws do not.”1
INTRODUCTION
Recall the old VISA commercials portraying a modern consumer’s synchronized and effortless credit card transactions undermined by the one Luddite
with the audacity to bring the marketplace to a grinding halt by presenting cash
(or worse, a check).2 By visualizing faster and more efficient payments, consumers would transition to credit cards for their convenience, not because it
was a safer or more secure option. Rather than emphasize the credit card itself,
VISA’s viscerally engaging and forward-looking advertisement allowed consumers to imagine heightened human experiences made possible because of
technology. Fast-forwarding to our modern brave new world, our financial
ecosystem and definition of “trust”3 have rapidly changed.4 People engage
†J.D. Candidate, May 2018, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A. 2015, Rhodes College. The author would like to extend her deep gratitude to Professor
Heidi M. Schooner for her mentorship, expertise, and invaluable guidance in drafting this
Note. The author is also grateful to her colleagues on the Catholic University Journal of Law
and Technology for their contributions to this Note. Lastly, the author wishes to thank her
parents for their unwavering love, patience, and support during the writing process and
throughout law school.
1 HAL R. VARIAN & CARL SHAPIRO, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 1-2 (Har. Bus. Sch. Press 1999).
2
See Allen N. Berger et al., The Economic Effects of Technological Progress: Evidence from the Banking Industry, 35 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 141, 149-50
(2002).
3
See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 256-57 (Oxford
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socially,5 take food from,6 get into cars with,7 and inhabit the homes of
strangers.8 The invention of the Internet, paired with the mass proliferation of
mobile phones,9 has transformed consumer financial conduct10and cultivated a

Univ. Press 1996) (arguing that it is misleading to use of “the term ‘trust’ to describe commercial exchange for which cost-effective safeguards have been devised in support of more
efficient exchange. Calculative trust is a contradiction in its terms … Trust is made more
transparent and operational by treating calculated trust as a subset of calculated risk.”).
4
See Somini Sengupta, The Post-Cash, Post-Credit-Card Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/sunday-review/the-post-cash-post-creditcard-economy.html.
5
Aaron Smith, 6 new facts about Facebook, PEWRESEARCHCENTER (Feb. 3, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/03/6-new-facts-about-facebook/.
6
Heather Haddon, Grocers Feel Chill From Millennials, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/grocers-feel-chill-from-millennials-1477579072?mod=e2fb
(identifying that millennials preference toward online grocery delivery services, including
Instacart, Inc. suggests a “permanent shift in [consumer] shopping patterns”).
7
See From zero to seventy (billion), ECONOMIST (Sept. 3, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21706249-accelerated-life-and-times-worldsmost-valuable-startup-zero-seventy. The ride-hailing startup Uber carries a valuation close
to $70 billion. See From zero to seventy (billion), ECONOMIST (Sept. 3, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21706249-accelerated-life-and-times-worldsmost-valuable-startup-zero-seventy. “No technology firm in history has raised more money
from private investors before going public.” From zero to seventy (billion), ECONOMIST
(Sept. 3, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21706249-accelerated-life-andtimes-worlds-most-valuable-startup-zero-seventy. Investor optimism is supported by Uber’s
position at the intersection of three linked disruptive trends: first, the emergence of assetlight business models; second, the shift to the sharing economy—for without which, the
success of peer-to-peer service based business models would be non-existent; and third,
consumers’ willingness to pay for access to things is increasingly outweighing their will for
outright ownership. From zero to seventy (billion), ECONOMIST (Sept. 3, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21706249-accelerated-life-and-times-worldsmost-valuable-startup-zero-seventy.
8
Air BnB is an online marketplace for people to list, discover and book accommodations at any price point in more than 34,000 cities and 191 countries. See about us, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
9
The steady increase in the adoption of smartphone users has resulted in the prevalence of services that allow consumers to obtain financial account information and conduct
transactions with their financial institution (“mobile banking”) and that allow consumers to
make payments, transfer money, or pay for goods and services (“mobile payments”). See
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, CONSUMERS AND MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES 11 (Mar. 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/consumers-andmobile-financial-services-report-201603.pdf; see also Hal Varian, Intelligent Technology,
INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY
FUND
7
(Sept.
2016),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/09/pdf/varian.pdf (acknowledging that
computer mediation can impact economic activity through five channels: (1) data collection
and analysis, (2) personalization and customization, (3) experimentation and continuous
improvement, (4) contractual innovation, and (5) coordination and communication).
10 See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, CONSUMERS AND MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES 2016 (Mar. 2016).

2017]

Nobody Puts Blockchain in a Corner

355

societal expectation of progress as determined by the level of convenience.11
Why? Companies are cognizant of the new peer-to-peer services (“P2P”) code
of the sharing economy:12 get rich or adapt trying.13
Following the global financial crises of 2007-2009,14 the world’s trust in
banks was at an all-time low.15 Capitalizing on this time, Satoshi Nakamoto16 (a
person or an entity) pseudonymously released Bitcoin17 to replace the traditional role of the banker18 and provide a more transparent, equitable, and efficient
payment system.19 The range of Bitcoin’s initial negative publicity, including
price volatility,20 hacking,21 fraudulent investment schemes,22 and black market
11 Consumers cite that “convenience” is the most common reason motivating their adoption of mobile payment activity. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, CONSUMERS AND MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES 2016 (Mar. 2016).
12 ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE
RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM (2016). See also DON TAPSCOTT AND ANTHONY WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: HOW MASS COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING (2006).
13 CHRIS SKINNER, VALUEWEB 162 (2016) (“Apps and mobile are changing the retail
experience; [Application Program Interfaces] are shifting the operations to real-time processing; and cloud, combined with data analytics are changing product and service.”); see
also David McBride, General Corporation Laws: History and Economics, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 9-10 (2010) (analyzing the economic evolutionary effects of how physical
technologies, social technologies, and business organization interact and coevolve); ERIC
BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY AND THE RADICAL REMAKING OF ECONOMICS 15 (2006) (recognizing “social technologies” as “ways of organizing
people to do things”).
14 See HAL SCOTT, CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION (MIT Press 2016).
15 See generally The origins of the financial crisis: Crash course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7,
2016), http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-arestill-being-felt-five-years-article (explaining how the dissolution of “trust, the ultimate glue
of all financial systems” combined with central bankers and regulators failure to exercise
proper oversight of financial institutions spread panic throughout the market and led to increased government intervention). See also What causes financial crises?, ECONOMIST
(Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/09/economistexplains-economics-2.
16 It has been theorized that “the name might be a portmanteau of four technology companies: SAmsung, TOSHIba, NAKAmichi, and MOTOrola.” DAVID LEE KUO CHUEN,
HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL CURRENCY: BITCOIN, INNOVATION, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, AND
BIG DATA 11, n.1 (2015).
17 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN 8
(2009), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. See also History of Bitcoin: The World’s First Decentralized Currency, HISTORYOFBITCOIN, http:// historyofbitcoin.org/ (last visited Oct. 26,
2016) [hereinafter Bitcoin History].
18 BRIAN KELLY, THE BITCOIN BIG BANG 79 (2015).
19 DAVID LEE KUO CHUEN, HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL CURRENCY: BITCOIN, INNOVATION,
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, AND BIG DATA 12 (2015). The centralized core through which
virtual currencies, like bitcoin., seeks to disrupt traditional legacy payment methods, including banknotes and bank-wires, checks, and all forms of card payments, credit. See RICHARD
D. PORTER AND WADE ROUSSE., REINVENTING MONEY AND LENDING FOR THE DIGITAL AGE,
in BANKING BEYOND BANKS AND MONEY 147 (PAOLO TASCA ET AL. eds., 2016).
20 Jonathan Todd Barker, Why is Bitcoin’s Value So Volatile, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/052014/why-bitcoins-value-so-volatile.asp
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for the deep web,23 conditioned the public’s perception of all cryptocurrencies
with illicit purposes.24 Despite bitcoin’s “growing pains,”25 venture capitalists,26
software developers,27 and technology start-up companies28 continued to assert
(last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
21 Laura Shin, Hackers Have Stolen Millions of Dollars in Bitcoin—Using Only Phone
Numbers,
FORBES
(Dec.
20,
2017),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2016/12/20/hackers-have-stolen-millions-of-dollarsin-bitcoin-using-only-phone-numbers/#50df2f9222db.
22 See also SEC v. Shavers, Case No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D.
Tex. Sept. 18, 2014).
23 The currency’s association with Silk Road created the misconception that all bitcoin
is linked to money launderers and terrorists.
24 Simon Taylor, Blockchain: understanding the potential, BARCLAYS 2 (July 2015),
https://www.barclayscorporate.com/content/dam/corppublic/corporate/Documents/insight/bl
ockchain_understanding_the_potential.pdf. “[A]longside … [Bitcoin’s] hype, many clichés
and misconceptions have grown up around the digital currency and its underlying technology. These misconceptions can hinder discussions about the future direction of development
and the way in which initiatives are presented in the media.” Blockchain: Understandig The
Potential, CONTRACTSIT, http://contractsit.com/blockchain-understanding-the-potential/ (last
visited Feb. 20, 2017).
25 Michael Casey and Paul Vigna, Bitcoin and the Digital-Currency Revolution: For all
bitcoin’s growing pains, it represents the future of money and global finance, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 23, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-revolutionary-power-of-digital-currency1422035061 (quoting former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers: “substantial
inefficiencies” of an outdated financial system make it “ripe for disruption”).
26 “Bitcoin represents not only the future of payments but also the future of governance.” CHRIS SKINNER, VALUEWEB 99 (2016) (quoting Dee Hock, Founder of Visa). See
also Marc Andreessen, Why Bitcoin Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/why-bitcoin-matters/. The practical consequence
of solving this problem is that Bitcoin gives us, for the first time, a way for one Internet user
to transfer a unique piece of digital property to another Internet user, such that the transfer is
guaranteed to be safe and secure, everyone knows that the transfer has taken place, and nobody can challenge the legitimacy of the transfer. The consequences of this breakthrough
are hard to overstate.
27 IBM Launches First Highly Secure Blockchain Services for Financial Services, Government and Healthcare on IBM Cloud, IBM (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/49632.wss (announcing a new framework for blockchain networks to operate securely in addition to meeting current regulatory and security
requirements).
28 Edward Robinson and Matthew Leising, Blythe Masters Tells Banks the Blockchain
Changes
Everything,
BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
31,
2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-09-01/blythe-masters-tells-banks-theblockchain-changes-everything. Blythe Masters is the CEO of Digital Asset Holdings. See
Edward Robinson and Matthew Leising, Blythe Masters Tells Banks the Blockchain Changes
Everything,
BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
31,
2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-09-01/blythe-masters-tells-banks-theblockchain-changes-everything (“[Blockchain is] analogous to e-mail for money.”). See
generally Edward Robinson and Matthew Leising, Blythe Masters Tells Banks the Blockchain
Changes
Everything,
BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
31,
2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-09-01/blythe-masters-tells-banks-the-
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that the true value of Bitcoin is the blockchain,29 the distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) in which the bitcoin currency operates.30 Previous discussions
surrounding blockchain were initially constrained to educating others on how
the technology worked and hype” over the potential applications that might be
implemented in the distant future. 31 While it was previously speculated that the
financial services and banking industries would have to wait five to ten years
before the potential of blockchain technology was actually turned into a reality,
IBM released a report stating that “2017 looks to be the year banking on
blockchain’s shifts from zero to sixty.”32 Accordingly, the global competition
to service distributed ledger technology by incorporating it into the existing
financial services industry is advancing in real time.33 The World Economic
Forum34 estimates that more than 25 countries are investing in blockchain
technology, filing more than 2,500 patents35 and investing $1.3 billion.36 Regublockchain-changes-everything.
29 Bitcoin’s cryptographically secure blockchain protocol provides the ability to record
and transfer value without intermediaries. See CHRIS SKINNER, VALUEWEB 190 (2016). At a
high level, the blockchain “combin[es] peer-to-peer networks, cryptographic algorithms,
distributed data storage, and a decentralized consensus mechanisms [sic]” to “provide[sic] a
way for people to agree on a particular state of affairs and record that agreement in a secure
and verifiable manner.” Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain
Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia, SSRN 4–5, 5 & n.15 (Mar. 12, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664.
30 See Jeff John Roberts, The Crisis in Bitcoin and the Rise of Blockchain, FORTUNE
(Mar. 4, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/04/crisis-in-bitcoin-rise-of-blockchain/.
31 See Nicole Bullock, Blockchain starts transition from hype to everyday use in markets, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/08d54cdc-74e2-11e6-bf48b372cdb1043a; How Coin Center Is Helping Define The ‘Big Fuzzy Gray Area’ Of Blockchain
And
Cryptocurrency
Law,
TUNEIN
(Oct.
18,
2016),
http://tunein.com/embed/player/t109377177/ (discussing how one of the ways CoinCenter
represents bitcoin blockchain technology, includes ensuring that policy makers “understand
the technology and don’t do anything stupid” by “mak[ing] easy to avoid mistakes”).
32 Jemima Kelly, Banks adopting blockchain ‘dramatically faster’ than expected: IBM,
REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-blockchain-ibmidUSKCN11Y28D.
33 J. Christopher Giancarlo, Commissioner, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,
Address to the American Enterprise Institute, 21st Century Markets Need 21st Century
Regulation
(Sept.
29
2016),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagiancarlo-17 (acknowledging that
in comparison to international regulatory efforts that have been effected to address distributed ledger technology, the United States is “falling behind”).
34 Disruptive innovation in financial services: A Blueprint for Digital Identity, WORLD
ECONOMIC
FORUM
(Aug.
12,
2016),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_A_Blueprint_for_Digital_Identity.pdf.
35 See Megan M. La Belle & Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Big Banks and Business Method Patents, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 431, 477-87 (2014) (discussing the underlying motivations
and implications of increased big bank participation in the patent system). See also Bailey
Reutzel, The Looming War for Blockchain Patents, COINDESK (Sept. 24, 2016),
http://www.coindesk.com/looming-war-blockchain-patents/ (noting the scope and enforceability of bank’s blockchain patents is currently unknown). For example, On November 15,
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latory interest in financial technology (“FinTech”)37 in the United States represents a turning point,38 in which the focus shifts from attempting to prevent the
previous crises, to looking at how to support future market developments while
maintaining financial stability. 39
Blockchain technology has been frequently, and appropriately, analogized to
the Internet Protocol.40 The potential of each respective protocol is realized
after the application of a new layer of services on top of the technology.41 Similar to how the Internet fundamentally changed the way we share information,
blockchain is an open source innovation that is going to revolutionize the
transactions among individuals, governments, businesses, and machines.42
2015, Goldman Sachs filed a patent for “methods for settling securities in financial markets
using distributed peer to peer and cryptographic techniques,” using a proprietary coin called
SETLcoin. DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD 70 (2016).
36 Philip Stafford, Banks struggle to make blockchain fast and secure, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 26, 2016),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/e0a32840-4f68-11e6-8172-e39ecd3b86fc.html#axzz4LNglVau0.
UBS, Deutsche Bank, Santander, BNY Mellon and interdealer broker ICAP pioneered a
blockchain-based digital token, which they hope could form the industry standard to clear
and settle trades. See generally Disruptive innovation in financial services: A Blueprint for
Digital
Identity,
WORLD
ECONOMIC
FORUM
(Aug.
12,
2016),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_A_Blueprint_for_Digital_Identity.pdf.
37 See generally J. Christopher Giancarlo, Commissioner, U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading
Comm’n,
Address
to
the
Cato
Institute,
Cryptocurrency: The Policy Challenges of a Decentralized Revolution
(Apr.
12,
2016),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagiancarlo-14#P35_11428 (“Regulation of DLT [distributed ledger technology] must indeed be coordinated on a multilateral
level based on the principle of ‘do no harm.’ Just as many financial services firms are joining together in broad DLT consortiums, regulators must do the same.”). See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION IN THE
FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM: AN OCC PERSPECTIVE (Mar. 2016).
38 DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD 299 (2016).
39 Id.
40 Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Aff., 113th Con. 5 (2013)
(Statement of Patrick Murck, General Counsel, The Bitcoin Foundation). “Bitcoin is a protocol. It is like TCP/IP, which enables all the different uses people around the globe invented for the Internet. And it is like HTML, which enables all the different uses people invented for the World Wide Web without having to ask anyone’s permission. We envision
Bitcoin as a driver of global change that rivals these other protocols in terms of the benefits
it delivers to humankind across the globe.” Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and
Promises of Virtual Currencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Homeland Sec. and Gov’t
Aff., 113th Con. 5 (2013) (Statement of Patrick Murck, General Counsel, The Bitcoin Foundation).
41 See KELLY, supra note 18, at 77. Services include social engagement, (Facebook),
entertainment (iTunes), information (Google) and marketplace (Amazon).
42 See Perianne Boring, The Beauty Of The Blockchain, FORBES (Jun. 17, 2016),
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This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I identifies the tripartite characteristics of Bitcoin: the blockchain, the protocol, and the currency. It examines the
processes within the Bitcoin ecosystem and demonstrates how a bitcoin transaction operates and explains the layout of the blockchain ecosystem in terms of
the transaction, recording, and verification. Part II addresses how blockchain
technology will disrupt the financial services industry. First, it addresses the
digitization of the banking industry. Second, it identifies the need for collaboration between banks and FinTechs. It explores what precautions need to be
taken to ensure consumer protection and security of one’s digital identity and
why it is in the government’s best interest to endorse blockchain technology.
Third, it examines the regulatory challenges that banks and FinTechs face prior
to the implementation and widespread adoption of blockchain technology can
take place. Part III evaluates the legal and regulatory issues that may arise as a
result of blockchain’s disruptive role in the financial services industry. First, it
identifies the current state of regulation for the application of distributed ledger
technology as a virtual currency. Second, it analyzes how a disjointed regulatory emphasis on virtual currencies and failure to endorse blockchain technology
in the financial services industry directly threatens to stifle innovation, capital
formation, consumer protection, and national cybersecurity. Third, it compares
the rules-based regulatory approach to money licensing regimes in the United
States with the United Kingdom’s principles-based regulatory sandbox. Fourth,
it argues why a national FinTech charter would be possible to implement in the
United States and how it would correspond with joint proposed rule by the Office of the Comptroller, Department of Treasury and Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation for cybersecurity standards.
I. IT’S ALL ABOUT THE BLOCKCHAIN
Bitcoin is the first and largest cryptocurrency.43 A cryptocurrency is a peerto-peer (“P2P”) version of electronic cash that allows payments to be sent directly from one party to another without the need of an intermediary. 44 There
are three phases of the global financial technological revolution: Blockchain
1.0 emphasizes virtual currency,45 Blockchain 2.0 isolates technology and prohttp://www.forbes.com/sites/perianneboring/2016/06/17/the-beauty-of-theblockchain/#499aa2af4489.
43 For a list of other cryptocurrencies to data, see Crypto-Currency Market Capitalizations, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
44 DAVID LEE KUO CHUEN, HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL CURRENCY: BITCOIN, INNOVATION,
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, AND BIG DATA 16 (2015).
45 Melanie Swan, Decentralized Money: Bitcoin 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0, INSTITUTE FOR ETHICS
AND
EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES
(Nov.
10,
2014),
http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/swan20141110. The deployment of cryptocurrencies in
applications related to cash, such as currency transfer, remittance, and digital payment sys-
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tocol applications as to contracts,46 and Blockchain 3.0 is the expansion of the
technological applications beyond finance and markets.47 This Note is limited
to addressing the transition between Blockchain 1.0 to Blockchain 2.0. First,
this Section answers the question, “What is the difference between bitcoin and
blockchain?” by explaining the properties of the blockchain ecosystem. It accentuates the special properties of this technology and how it can be applied in
the financial services industry. Finally, it analyzes why the application of
blockchain technology will disrupt the financial services industry.
A. Bitcoin Ecosystem: Blockchain, Protocol, and Currency
Blockchain technology enables secure electronic transactions of bitcoin
through the Bitcoin protocol, which employs cryptography to validate transactions before recording them on a decentralized48 public ledger.49 The ledger in
which all network transactions are displayed is the blockchain.50 Bitcoin is
trustless technology51 that exists through a decentralized peer-to-peer (“P2P”)52
consensus network of Bitcoin clients (also known as nodes).53 The Bitcoin protems.
46 Id. Blockchain 2.0 space can include Bitcoin 2.0 protocols, smart contracts, smart
property, Dapps (decentralized applications), DAOs (decentralized autonomous organizations), and DACs (decentralized autonomous corporations). Melanie Swan, Decentralized
Money: Bitcoin 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0, INSTITUTE FOR ETHICS AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES (Nov.
10, 2014), http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/swan20141110.
47 See id.
48 GARETH W. PETERS AND EFSTATHIOS PANAYI, UNDERSTANDING MODERN BANKING
LEDGERS THROUGH BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGIES: FUTURE OF TRANSACTION PROCESSING AND
SMART CONTRACTS ON THE INTERNET OF MONEY 4 (2015). “Decentralization” describes
conditions under which the actions of many agents cohere and are effective despite the fact
that they do not rely on reducing the number of people whose will counts to direct effective
action.
49 Id. at 3-4. The word “ledger” refers to a book or set of records.
50 Id. at 4; see also Bruno Campenon, Fintech and the future of securities services, 8 J.
SEC. OPERATIONS & CUSTODY 107, 111 (2016) (“[B]itcoin acts as a decentrali[z]ed depositary, messaging system and settlement platform rolled into one.”)
51 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN.ORG
(Nov. 8 2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
52 A P2P network is a “network of personal computers, each of which acts as both client
and server, so that each can exchange files . . . with every other computer on the network.”
Peer-to-peer Network Definition, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/peer-to-peer%20network (last visited Sept. 30,
2016).
53 Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the
Rise
of
Lex
Cryptographia,
SSRN
4
(2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664. See Andreas M. Antonopoulos,
Mastering
Bitcoin,
Chapter
2
(2015),
http://chimera.labs.oreilly.com/books/1234000001802/index.html (“Nodes in a peer-to-peer

2017]

Nobody Puts Blockchain in a Corner

361

tocol employs public-key cryptography54 to verify and secure bitcoin transactions.55 As a publically distributed ledger, the blockchain ensures that all computers in the “Bitcoin network”56 have an updated and verified record of transactions within the network.57 Thus, the transparent nature of transactions in the
Bitcoin network that are recorded on the blockchain prevents fraud and the
“double-spending” problem58 by ensuring that every cryptocurrency can be
spent only once.59
1. Public Cryptographic Key
Bitcoin’s decentralized public ledger is the blockchain.60 The blockchain is a
“chronological database”61 of all transactions that have been validated by
network both provide and consume services at the same time with reciprocity acting as the
incentive for participation.”).
54 The word “cryptography” is derived from the Greek words kryptos (hidden) and
graphein (writing). Monica Pawlan, Cryptography: The Ancient Art of Secret Messages,
PAWLAN (Feb. 1998), http://www.pawlan.com/monica/articles/crypto. Cryptography is “the
scientific study of techniques for securing digital information, transactions, and distributed
computations.” JONATHAN KATZ & YEHUDA LINDELL,
INTRODUCTION TO MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY: PRINCIPLES AND PROCOCOLS 3 (2007).
55 See KELLY, supra note 18, at 23.
56 Andreas
M. Antonopoulos, Mastering Bitcoin, Chapter 2 (2015),
http://chimera.labs.oreilly.com/books/1234000001802/index.html (referring to the “bitcoin
network” as the collection of notes running through the bitcoin P2P protocol).
57 JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS 7 (2nd ed.
2016) (detailing the life cycle of a bitcoin transaction).
58 SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM 8 (2009),
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HCA-UUSR]. The double spending problem
is
also
called
the
“Byzantine Generals problem” – generals who are circling the enemy need to either simultaneously launch their attack or retreat; some attackers may be traitors, spread misinformation and effectively foil the attack. See Leslie Lamert et al., THE BYZANTINE GENERALS
PROBLEM, 4 ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems 382-401 (1982)
(addressing reliability concerns computer communications). Satoshi Nakamoto’s “Bitcoin
solution” to this Byzantine Generals Problem” cannot be understated – it is simply revolutionary.” KELLY, supra note 18, at 57.
59 ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN, LOC. Chapter 1 (2015) (ebook),
http://chimera.labs.oreilly.com/books/1234000001802/index.html. See also KUO CHUEN,
supra note 44, at 12 (detailing the technical aspects of a bitcoin transaction). See generally
KELLY, supra note 18, at 23 (earliest known banking ledgers date to 9000 BCE when transactions were literally written in stone).
60 See also Paul H. Farmer, Jr., Note & Comment, Speculative Tech: The Bitcoin Legal
Quagmire & the Need for Legal Innovation, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 85, 88–89 (2014) (“The
Bitcoin peer-to-peer network that allows for miners to generate Bitcoins also serves as a
public ledger for all Bitcoin transactions . . . The full record of transactions [within the network] is called a block chain, a sequence of records composing a virtual ledger.” (footnotes
omitted)).
61 Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the
Rise
of
Lex
Cryptographia,
SSRN
6
(Mar.
10,
2015),
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Bitcoin network participants.62 Each block63 that is added onto the blockchain
represents a transaction between two network users that manifested their intent
to transact by exchanging a minimum amount of public information, and is
verified by network participants, who compete to the decrypt puzzle of transaction consisting of private information.64 Once computers in the network reach a
consensus on the transaction’s validity, it is recorded and timestamped65 as a
new block on blockchain.66
Network users are given67 one public key, also known as a “public address”
that is shared to the network, like a social media profile page, and one private
key, the content of which is kept secret, like a password.68 The address informs
network participants where to transfer value.69
In order for bitcoin transactions between Bitcoin network users to appear on
the blockchain, parties must first manifest their intent to transact through the
exchange of their public key. In a bitcoin transaction, an individual proves authentication of bitcoin ownership through their private key and transfers the
value to the new owner’s address though the public key.70 Transactional securihttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664.
62 KUO CHUEN, supra note 44, at 16.
63 Blockchain, BITCOIN, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Block_chain (last visited Oct. 31,
2016), (providing that “[a] block chain is a transaction database shared by all nodes” on a
network).
64 Mining Bitcoin Has Become A Ruthlessly Competitive Business, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Jan. 11, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/mining-bitcoin-is-a-competitive-business2015-1 (providing that the cryptography competition ends when one node decrypts the
transacting parties puzzle –the decrypted puzzle verifies that the public identify of the parties corresponds with private information of the deal, namely the sufficiency of funds between the parties which underlies the parties transaction); JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS 8 (2nd ed. 2016 (explaining that mining involves the search is to find a sequence of data that produces a particular pattern when the
Bitcoin “hash” algorithm is applied to the data”).
65 See Joseph Bonneau et al., Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and
Cryptocurrencies, IEEE SECURITY AND PRIVACY (forthcoming May 2015),
http://www.jbonneau.com/doc/BMCNKF15-IEEESP-bitcoin.pdf.
66 KUO CHUEN, supra note 44, at 22. See also GARETH W. PETERS & EFSTATHIOS PANAYI, UNDERSTANDING MODERN BANKING LEDGERS THROUGH BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGIES:
FUTURE OF TRANSACTION PROCESSING AND SMART CONTRACTS ON THE INTERNET OF MONEY,
in BANKING BEYOND BANKS AND MONEY 239, 243 (Paolo Tasca et al eds., Springer Int’l.
Pub., 2016) (describing how final hash functions combine to form a new published block).
67 Bitcoin uses the public-cryptographic keys to maintain the “creation, use, and transfer
of digital value.” KEVIN C. TAYLOR, FINTECH LAW: A GUIDE TO TECHNOLOGY LAW IN THE
FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 12-2 (2014).
68 JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS 7 (2nd ed.
2016) (detailing the life cycle of a bitcoin transaction).
69 See KEVIN C. TAYLOR, FINTECH LAW: A GUIDE TO TECHNOLOGY LAW IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 12-2, (2014).
70 KEVIN C. TAYLOR, FINTECH LAW: A GUIDE TO TECHNOLOGY LAW IN THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES INDUSTRY 12-2, (2014).
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ty on the blockchain is afforded through the combination of a cryptographic
hash.71 Bitcoin solves the double-spending problem and provides transactional
security wherein each transaction has a digital signature and contains a cryptographic hash72 that allows for easy tamper detection.73 Thus, the two parties’
exchange of public keys initiates a bitcoin transaction because it effectively
requests computers on Bitcoin Network to validate the transaction to decrypt,
through the public key’s information, the content of the private.74
2. Blockchain Protocol and Consensus-Based Transaction Mechanisms
Consensus
Bitcoin exists through a peer-to-peer network (“P2P”)75 of Bitcoin users who
have access to all transactions. As a distributed public ledger,76 Bitcoin requires
that all transactions be publically announced to all computers on the Bitcoin
network, called nodes. 77 If Alice wants to transact with Bob, Alice initiates
this process by broadcasting to the network “I, Alice, give Bob one bitcoin” by
signing off the transaction with her private key (i.e., her signature). Before
Bitcoin network users can view transactions on the blockchain ledger, miners
must first reach a consensus78 to validate the transaction.79 Users that providing
See PETERS & PANAYI, supra note 66, at 243.
See SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN
(2009), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. See also PETERS & PANAYI, supra note 66, at 243
(evaluating how second-generation contract-based developments of blockchain technology
can be applied to data integrity protocols in the banking industry to achieve varying degrees
of “permissioning, data integrity, and data security.”).
73 KUO CHUEN, supra note 44, at 16.
74 See Larissa Lee, New Kids on the Blockchain: How Bitcoin’s Technology Could Reinvent the Stock Market, 12 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 81, 98 (2016).
75 Peer-to-peer
Network
Definition,
DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/peer-to-peer%20network (last visited Feb. 10, 2017)
(a P2P network is a “network of personal computers, each of which acts as both client and
server, so that each can exchange files . . . with every other computer on the network”).
76 Private or permissioned blockchains are also known as shared or distributed ledgers.
Gideon Greenspan, Payment and Exchange Transactions in Shared Ledgers, 10 J. PAYMENTS STRATEGY & SYS. 172, 172 (2016) (identifying what characteristics distinguish distributed ledgers from centralized ledgers, as well as bitcoin-style blockchain from etherumstyle blockchain).
77 See SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN
(2009), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
78 See Joseph Bonneau et al., Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and
Cryptocurrencies, IEEE SECURITY AND PRIVACY (forthcoming May 2015),
http://www.jbonneau.com/doc/BMCNKF15-IEEESP-bitcoin.pdf (noting that the implications of Bitcoin’s consensus protocol includes “self-enforcing (“smart”) contracts, decentralized markets and order books, and distributed autonomous agents”).
79 See Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and
the
Rise
of
Lex
Cryptographia,
SSRN
7
(Mar.
10,
2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664.
71
72
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computing power to log and reconcile transactions on the ledger are called
miners.80 Miners compete to be the first to validate the transaction through
computationally intense process, known as “proof-of-work,” in which they
determine the legitimacy of the transaction.81 Once a consensus has been
reached as to the transaction’s legitimacy, it is recorded, time-stamped, and
displayed in one “block” of the blockchain.82
3. Proof of Work
A “block”83 of data will be added to the blockchain once computers on the
Bitcoin network84 reach a consensus as to the transaction’s validity.85 The
mechanism in which transactions are validated is through the computationally
intensive “proof-of-work” of all transactions that constitute the blockchain and
depends upon the amount of computing processing power being contributed to
the network. 86 Mining is integral in the issuance of new bitcoins and is a necessary process for transactions to be added onto the blockchain and subsequently verified. 87 The mining process in which transactions are verified is
computationally intensive to ensure that only legitimate transactions are verified and recorded onto the blockchain. 88
B. The Evolution of Financial Intermediaries and the Application of
80 JERRY BRITO AND ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS 7 (2nd
ed. 2016).
81 KUO CHUEN, supra note 44, at 16.
82 JERRY BRITO AND ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS 7 (2nd
ed. 2016).
83 Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the
Rise
of
Lex
Cryptographia,
SSRN
48-49
(Mar.
12,
2015)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664 (citing Blockchain, BITCOIN
FOUNDATION WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Block_chain (last accessed Mar. 21, 2017)
(“Every block contains information about a certain number of transactions, a reference to
the preceding block in the blockchain, as well as an answer to a complex mathematical puzzle, which is used to validate the data associated with that block.”)
84 Computers in the Bitcoin network are “nodes.” See Bitcoin Glossary, COINDESK,
http://www.coindesk.com/information/bitcoin-glossary/#n (last visited Mar. 21, 2017) (defining “nodes” as “[a] computer connected to the bitcoin network using a client that relays
transactions to others”).
85 PETERS & PANAYI, supra note 66, at 242 (manuscript at 4); Gareth Peters et al.,
Trends in crypto-currencies and blockchain technologies: a monetary theory and regulation
perspective, SSRN 2 (Aug. 15, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2646618.
86 NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD: BITCOIN AND THE INSIDE STORY OF THE MISFITS
AND MILLIONAIRES TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY 23 (2016).
87 KUO CHUEN, supra note 44, at 19.
88 Id.
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Blockchain Technology
The distributed leger technology of Bitcoin’s blockchain can virtually incorporate the contractual process in “anything that can be digitally identified.”89
Consequently, blockchain technology enables the creation and execution of
digital “smart contracts,” 90 a term Nick Szabo first introduced in 1996. 91 The
development of FinTech, blockchain technology, and associated smart contracts, has the potential to reshape transaction costs in the financial system. It is
significant to note, however, that smart contracts are automation, not law.92
Smart contracts are modules of computer code than run on blockchains.93 They
are permissioned94 and cryptographically verifiable self-executing programs95
that are dependent on certain triggering conditions to transfer digital assets on
the blockchain.96 Smart contract protocol can specify, as computer code, the
terms under which certain obligations are fulfilled and can execute actions like
sending a payment or deactivating a file once there is evidence of the contract’s terms’ fulfillment.97
The evolution of financial institutions is arguably shaped by the relationship
between varying levels of trust and differences in transaction costs. Specifically, it is argued that the application of distributed ledger technology will disrupt
traditional financial service institutions because it revolutionizes the role of the
KELLY, supra note 18, at 153.
KELLY, supra note 18, at 154; see also MELANIE SWAN, BLOCKCHAIN: BLUEPRINT FOR
A NEW ECONOMY 21 (2015); see also Pavel Maltsev, A Next Generation Smart Contract &
Decentralized
Application
Platform,
GITHUB
(Jan.
5,
2015),
https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper.
91 See Michael Gord, Smart Contracts Described by Nick Szabo 20 Years Ago Now
Becoming
Reality,
BITCOIN
MAGAZINE
(Apr.
26,
2016),
https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/smart-contracts-described-by-nick-szabo-years-agonow-becoming-reality-1461693751/ (conceiving the idea of digital “smart” contracts); but
see Allan I. Mendelowitz &Willi Brammertz, Smart Contracts Were Around Long Before
Cryptocurrency,
AM.
BANKER
(Nov.
17,
2016),
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/smart-contracts-were-around-long-beforecryptocurrency-1092463-1.html (noting that banks have imperfectly implemented smart
contracts into their business for three decades, as exemplified by transaction processing
systems and data warehouses).
92 JAMES HAZARD ET AL, ARE TRANSACTIONS COSTS DRIVERS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS? CONTRACTS MADE IN HEAVEN, HELL, AND THE CLOUD IN BETWEEN, in BANKING BEYOND BANKS AND MONEY 226 (PAOLO TASCA ET AL. eds., 2016) (emphasis in original).
93 See Id; KELLY, supra note 18, at 150 (identifying smart contracts as legal documents
attached to a bitcoin transaction).
94 Permissioned, in this context, means shared among the parties involved in a transaction.
95 HAZARD ET AL, supra note 92, at 225.
96 Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 36, 38 (2014).
97 ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE
RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM 93 (2016).
89
90
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intermediary. The three dimensions of transaction costs, which are (1) definition and manufacturing, (2) monitoring, and (3) enforcement of contracts, resemble the stages of financial banking intermediation, which involve (1) underwriting and manufacturing of financial instruments, (2) monitoring and
screening credit and market risks to the value of contracts, and (3) enforcement/execution of financial contracts.98 Banks’ business model of operating
through the centralization of control has not significantly changed from Italian
banks of the 1400’s and commercial banks of the 1930’s.99 However, the geographical expansion of what diverse and complex services and transactions
banks could provide clients has resulted in the association of financial intermediaries with an increase in transaction costs. Blockchain technology, therefore,
has been recognized as the most “truly disruptive technological advancements
to the practice of law since the invention of the printing press”100 because smart
contracts can facilitate the replacement of banking financial intermediaries.
The role of banks in intermediation, initially established to solidify trust among
contract counterparties and promote transparency, depreciates in the presence
of a trustless technology that accomplishes the same functions.101
A smart contract is self-executing software that is able to autonomously and
precisely determine each payment required by the contract.102 To be put differently, a smart financial contract represents the black-letter legal obligations
contained in a natural language contract.103 The risks posed by smart contracts
are reduced because they are autonomous, self-sufficient, and decentralized.104
Smart contracts resemble the design of Bitcoin in that they “subsist inde-

HAZARD ET AL, supra note 92, at 218.
Jacob H. Gutwillg, Note, Glass Versus Steagall: The Fight Over Federalism and
American Banking, 100 VA. L. REV. 771, 775 (2014).
100 Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the
Rise
of
Lex
Cryptographia,
SSRN
12-13
(Mar.
15,
2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664.
101 Anil Awasthi, ‘Revolutionary’ Smart Contracts Automate Trust, PAYMENTS SOURCE
(Sept. 8, 2016) https://www.paymentssource.com/opinion/revolutionary-smart-contractsautomate-trust.
102 See Allan I. Mendelowitz & Willi Brammertz, Smart Contracts Were Around Long
Before
Cryptocurrency,
AM.
BANKER
(Nov.
17,
2016)
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/smart-contracts-were-around-long-beforecryptocurrency-1092463-1.html (recognizing that banks have imperfectly implemented
smart contracts into their business for three decades, as exemplified by transaction processing systems (“TPS”), data warehouses (“DW”)).
103 Allan I. Mendelowitz & Willi Brammertz, Smart Contracts Were Around Long Before
Cryptocurrency,
AM.
BANKER
(Nov.
17,
2016)
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/smart-contracts-were-around-long-beforecryptocurrency-1092463-1.html.
104 SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 97, at 93.
98
99
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pendently of any moral or legal entity.”105 Smart contract codes define and
manage ownership rights.106 Due to the immutability of a decentralized and
distributed ledger, the smart contract codes do not make any assumptions about
the assignment of rights, nor can they arbitrarily seize, divest or transfer these
rights.107 Smart contract code is jurisdictionally neutral and therefore allows
“borderless” enforceability, no longer restricted by the jurisprudential reliance
of political borders. With smart contracts, it is the code that is the law.108 As a
result, the trustless blockchain provides a faster, more efficient, and secure
means of transacting and contracting, and the reduction of transaction costs
will increase the amount of market participants.
In conclusion, decentralized and autonomous applications of blockchain will
disrupt the traditional role of intermediaries. The implementation of smart financial contracts in an open source dynamic will result in the optimization of
contracting and transacting. The impact of distributed ledger technology and
the application of smart contracts in the financial services industry will be discussed in the next Section.
II. DISRUPTION: THE ROLE OF FINTECH SERVICES IN TRADITIONAL
BANKING
The disruptive role that blockchain will have on banking is clear – banking
financial intermediaries operate through a centralized control of authority and
the autonomous, self-serving, and decentralized applications of blockchain
replace the intermediaries.109 This section analyzes how blockchain technology
will disrupt the financial services and banking industry. It emphasizes the economics of blockchain in terms of how disintermediation110 and decentralization
will likely shift the economic organization of banking.111
105 Primavera de Filippi, Tomorrow’s Apps Will Come from Brilliant (and Risky) Bitcoin
Code, WIRED (Mar. 8, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/decentralizedapplications-built-bitcoin-great-except-whos-responsible-outcomes/.
106 See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 38, at 142 (explaining how smart contracts
eliminate the need for a bureaucracy to define ownership and generate wealth).
107 Id. at 143 (2016) (describing how the functionality of the code would replace the need
for a centralized ledger).
108 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 4 (2d ed. 2006) (arguing “[c]ode is law”
and that within the realm of cyberspace, the invisible hand, pushed by government and by
commerce, highly efficient regulation is possible).
109 See generally SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 97, at 93.
110 Disintermediation refers “to the general process of designing transactions that remove
the need for a trusted intermediary.” See Joseph Bonneau et al., Research Perspectives and
Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies, IEEE SECURITY AND PRIVACY (forthcoming May 2015), http://www.jbonneau.com/doc/BMCNKF15-IEEESP-bitcoin.pdf.
111 TRENT J. MACDONALD, ET AL., BLOCKCHAINS AND THE BOUNDARIES OF SELFORGANIZED ECONOMIES: PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF BANKING, in BANKING BEYOND
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A. Why the Financial Services Industry is Ripe for Disruption
The general function of blockchain technology is that it eliminates the role
of a financial intermediary. Thus, financial services is the most “obvious industry” 112 for initial “blockchain marketplace development”113 and disruption for a
number of reasons.114 Consider the three factors that define a bank:115 (1) by its
legal form; (2) by the services it offers; and (3) economic function to society.116
Its economic function to society is categorized by its role in financial intermediation117 and transaction services.118 Banks have dominated the payment system.119 Historically, a common feature of payment systems120 was that payment
service providers, traditionally banks, were at the same time standard-setters
and owners of the infrastructure.121
Traditional legacy bank structures continue to dominate.122 Card networks,
money transmissions and counterparty connectivity enable banks, merchants,
BANKS AND MONEY 279, 284 (PAOLO TASCA ET AL. eds., 2016).
112 KELLY, supra note 18, at 57.
113 SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 97, at 91.
114 RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 54 (5th ed.
2013).
115 Id. at 56-57 (quoting United States v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326 (1963)
(“Banks are unique among financial institutions in that they are alone permitted by law to
accept demand deposits. This distinctive power … gives banking a key role in the national
economy. For banks do not merely deal in, by are actually a source of, money and credit…Furthermore, the power to accept demand deposits makes banks the intermediaries in
most financial transactions (since transfers of substantial moneys are almost always by
check rather than by cash) and concomitantly, the repositories of very substantial individual
and corporate money. The banks use this money is conditioned by the fast that their working
capital consists largely of demand deposits, which makes liquidity the guiding principle of
bank lending and investing policies; this it is that banks are the chief source of the country’s
short-term business credit”)).
116 Id. at 38-46 (emphasis in original).
117 Id. at 39-40 (explaining that the benefits that financial intermediaries provide include
(1) offering diversification, (2) enable investors to enjoy economies of scale, (3) offer expertise, (4) convert illiquid investments into liquid ones).
118 Id. at 39-40.
119 Id. at 54 (5th ed. 2013).
120 A “payment system” is an organized arrangement for transferring value between its
participants. GEOFFREY P. MILLER & FABRIZIO CAFAGGI, THE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 118-19 (2013) citing ANDREW G. HALDANE ET AL., THE
FUTURE PAYMENTS SYSTEM 2 (2008). A “payment service” is the function of intermedition
between the payer and the payee in a market transaction. GEOFFREY P. MILLER & FABRIZIO
CAFAGGI, THE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 117 (2013).
121 GEOFFREY P. MILLER & FABRIZIO CAFAGGI, THE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 119 (2013).
122 For example, the Visa, MasterCard, SWIFT, EBA, CHIPS, Fedwire, RTGS, and
ACH, all of which have a relationship with traditional banking, dominate the market. CHRIS
SKINNER, VALUEWEB: HOW FINTECH FIRMS ARE USING BITCOIN BLOCKCHAIN AND MOBILE
TECHNOLOGIES TO CREATE THE INTERNET OF VALUE 155 (2016).
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corporates, and institutions to interoperate with trust and security.123 However,
as a consequence of the technological revolution, banks’ monopoly position as
a payment services provider has been jeopardized124 by FinTechs that target
“narrow financial services.”125 The goal of these narrow financial services is
the unbundling of banking through the offering of banking components.126
Looking at the evolution of the banking technology127 in the United States,
disintermediation128 and the concept of digitalization being disruptive are not
new.129 What is revolutionary, however, is that the blockchain democratizes
value in the same way the Internet of Things democratized information.130

123 CHRIS SKINNER, VALUEWEB: HOW FINTECH FIRMS ARE USING BITCOIN BLOCKCHAIN
AND MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES TO CREATE THE INTERNET OF VALUE 155-56 (2016).
124 MILLER & CAFAGGI, supra note 121, at 119
125 See SKINNER, supra note 123, at 13 (discussing how technology is changing the struc-

tures built in the past for paper distribution).
126 See id. For example, the peer-to-peer payment application Venmo, owned by PayPal,
provides an instantaneous monetary-transfer service. See e.g., Steve Lohr, A Financial Industry Scramble As More Pay by Smartphone, N.Y. TIMES, JAN. 19, 2016, at A-1 (recognizing that the millennial-led shift toward digital financial services, like Venmo, threatens to
permanently depriving to permanently deprive the consumer banking industry of one of its
sectors).
127 Technology has catalyzed the evolution of the consumer financial marketplace in the
United States with the advent of new products and services. Throughout the 1950s, bankissued credit cards for general use were introduced and they have changed the way consumers spend and borrow. The 1960’s brought Automated Teller Machines, (“ATM’s), which
enabled consumers to conduct basic banking transactions on their own time. The Automated
Clearing House (ACH) network was established in the 1970s and has become one of the
largest payment networks in the world. What Is ACH?: Quick Facts About the Automated
Clearing
House
(ACH)
Network,
NACHA
(Oct.
1,
2015),
https://www.nacha.org/news/what-ach-quick-facts-about-automatedclearing-house-achnetwork; see also Automated Clearinghouse Services: About, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL
RESERVE
SYSTEM,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedach_about.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2017). In the 1990s, online banking increased consumer convenience and financial autonomy. Allen N. Berger, The Economic Effects of Technological Progress: Evidence from the
Banking Industry, 35 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING (forthcoming 2003).
128 The removal of intermediaries is not a revolutionary concept, or one that banks are
unfamiliar, given the expansion of the computer placed mainframe computing power on the
desktop for personal use and the personalization of online banking, made possible by the
Internet. Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and
the
Rise
of
Lex
Cryptographia,
SSRN
48-49
(Mar.
12,
2015)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664.
129 See SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 97, at 54-56 (discussing how digital forces sustained
crowd-based capatialism); see also SKINNER, supra note 123, at 159; see also Joseph L.
Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave, HARV.
BUS. R. (1995), https://hbr.org/1995/01/disruptive-technologies-catching-the-wave (recognizing that one of the determinative factors that contributes to a business’s failure, success,
or market domination is its ability to develop and commercialize new technologies that adequately address the next-generation performance needs of their customers).
130 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 38, at 299.
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Blockchain operates a decentralized131 public ledger of transactions that no one
person or company owns or controls.132 In the “Internet of Value” 133 the blockchain is referred to as the “value exchange network” because it is an exchange
platform for digital value on the Internet and the programmability of its bitcoin
has the ability to trigger efficient, fast, and secure actions directly wired into
the real world.134 Similar to how the Internet of Things fundamentally changed
the way we share information,135 blockchain is an open source innovation that
is going to revolutionize the transactions amongst individuals, governments,136
businesses, and machines.137
As a part of the P2P sharing economy, the role of banks has expanded from
profit and trade to include community and social interaction.138 In an effort to
131 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 62 (2006) (defining democratization as “conditions under which the actions of many agents cohere and are effective despite
the fact that they do not rely on reducing the number of people whose will counts to direct
effective action”).
132 Mihaela Ulieru, Blockchain: what it is, how it really can change the world, WORLD
ECONOMIC FORUM (June 23, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/theblockchain (last visited Sept. 24, 2016); see also WILLIAM MOUGAYAR, THE BUSINESS
BLOCKCHAIN: PROMISE, PRACTICE, AND APPLICATION OF THE NEXT INTERNET TECHNOLOGY
90 (2016); see also CRAIG K. ELWELL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43339, BITCOIN:
QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES 1, 6 (2015).
133 See SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 97, at 56 (noting that the Internet of Things is transitioning from the early internet’s consumerization of the digital and onto the digitalization of
the physical).
134 See MOUGAYAR, supra note 132, at 155 (giving an example, that trust components are
stored on the blockchain (identity, rights, membership, ownership, and time stamping), services where a contractual component is executed on the blockchain (proof of service and
proof of compliance), on decentralized peer-to-peer market (e.g., OpenBazaar or La’Zooz),
through a Distributed Autonomous Organization (whose governance and operations run on
the blockchain)).
135 Perianne Boring, The Beauty Of The Blockchain, FORBES (June 17, 2016),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/perianneboring/2016/06/17/the-beauty-of-theblockchain/#2bf379194489; see also Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation Of ‘The Internet
Of
Things’,
FORBES
(May
13,
2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-thingsthat-anyone-can-understand/#1b4567d46828 (defining the Internet of Things as
“the concept of basically connecting any device
with an on and off switch to the Internet (and/or to each other)”).
136 See Bart van Liebergen et al., Regtech in Financial Services: Solutions for Compliance
and
Reporting,
INST.
OF
INT’L
FIN.
2
(Mar.
22,
2016),
https://www.iif.com/publication/research-note/regtech-financial-services-solutionscompliance-and-reporting (defining “regtech” as “the use of new technologies to solve regulatory and compliance requirements more effectively and efficiently”).
137 Perianne Boring, The Beauty Of The Blockchain, FORBES (June 17, 2016),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/perianneboring/2016/06/17/the-beauty-of-theblockchain/#499aa2af4489.
138 See SKINNER, supra note 123, at 77 (discussing how banks are adapting to mobile
opportunities). There are three categories of start-applications: wrappers, replacesrs, and

2017]

Nobody Puts Blockchain in a Corner

371

maintain and acquire customers that prioritize the digital components of banking, banks have been leading in the market of mobile innovation.139 The increase of startup banking applications which merely “wrap” themselves around
a bank’s mobile ecosystem do not pose a threat to the bank’s own innovations.140 However, given the rate at which technological payment innovations
have moved from mobile and onto taking payments in “connected ‘internet of
things’ devices,” the traditional payment infrastructure has struggled to keep
up.141 This shortcoming reveals a differential feature between banks’ and
FinTechs’142 respective market advantages and institutional strengths: whereas
banks’ stop-gap strategy has been to layer new technological solutions on top
of legacy systems, FinTechs are already digital at their core.143 Notably, banks
and FinTechs each possess something that the other is likely unable to acquire
within the immediate future: banks have the market expertise, regulatory familiarity, trusted brand name, and most importantly, a banking license, and
FinTechs innovate with digital embedded in their culture.144
reformers. Wrappers wrap themselves around old financial marketplace and their goal is to
reduce friction (e.g., ApplePay). The goal of replacers is to replace core banking services
with software and servers (e.g., Prosper and Lenging Club). Reformers utilize mobile and
digital currency technology to transform financial services.
139 See id; see also Episode #134: Blockchain is essential to the Fintech revolution,
SoundCloud:
BreakingBank$
(Mar.
3,
2016)
available
at
https://soundcloud.com/breakingbanks/blockchain-essential-fintech (recognizing that the
“digital” consumer no longer evaluates their satisfaction with banks according to a standard
of friendliness).
140 See SKINNER, supra note 123, at 228 (proposing that human behavior will forward the
next technological issues of the future).
141 Hannah Kuchler, Payments networks battle new breed of criminals in cyber attacks,
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/44340cda-4ff5-11e6-8172e39ecd3b86fc (providing that banks in competition with fintechs must perform cost benefit
analysis to determine whether the risk of fraud outweighs a less convenient user experience).
142 The label “fintech” may be affixed “to almost any start-up that is trying to use technology to solve some financial problem, and that can mean everything from insurance brokering to data analytics to budgeting software.” Ranking the Top Fintech Companies, N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
6,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/07/business/dealbook/The-Fintech-PowerGrab.html?_r=0; FinTech is comprised of five areas: (1) finance/investment, (2) operations/risk management, (3) payments/infrastructure, (4) data security monetization and (5)
customer interface. See DOUGLAS W. ARNER ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF FINTECH: A NEW
POST-CRISIS PARADIGM? 18 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of
New South Wales Law Research Series) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2676553.
143 See SKINNER, supra note 123, at 227 (discussing the emergence of Banco Original in
Brazil); see also Robert Barba, B of A’s Bessant on AI, Blockchain, Patents and Swift, AM.
BANKER (June 8, 2016) http://www.americanbanker.com/news/bank-technology/b-of-asbessant-on-ai-blockchain-patents-and-swift-1081389-1.html (noting banks that use technology cannot afford to be pure fintech companies because customers have much higher expectations of reliability).
144 See SKINNER, supra note 123, at 229-231(discussing the difference between tradition-
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The proliferation of smartphones has resulted in a rapid increase in the
growth of “mobile wallets,”145 which enable consumers to make payments via
their mobile phones.146 Despite millennial assertions that privacy is a priority,
the relinquishment of their private data to third parties suggests the significance of the need to enhance privacy protections to safeguard personal identity
information stored in digital wallets.147 Any device that has an IP address and is
connected to the Internet of Things is a vulnerability.148 When considering the
type149 and value of data secured by banks150 that is made accessible to its customers through the Internet,151 potential unknown vulnerabilities in current mobile banking software risk open source software breaches.152 With the understanding that payment systems are only as trustworthy as their weakest link,
the message to central banks and FinTechs alike is if you can’t beat them, join
a consortium.153

al banks and FinTechs).
145 See, e.g., Erin F. Fonté, Mobile Payments in the United States: How Disintermediation May Affect Delivery of Payment Functions, Financial Inclusion and Anti-Money Laundering Issues, 8 WASH. J .L. TECH. & ARTS 419, 421-22 (2013) (“Mobile payments technology is poised to create a globally dramatic shift in how individuals pay for goods and services, track spending, and manage personal finances.”).
146 BNY MELLON, INNOVATION IN PAYMENTS: THE FUTURE IS FINTECH 1 (2015),
https://www.bnymellon.com/_global-assets/pdf/our-thinking/innovation-in-payments-thefuture-is-fintech.pdf (acknowledging that the “era of fintech” is before us and bank’s mindfulness is insufficient; banks must establish a clear plan “to adapt to and benefit from
fintech-fuelled changes.”).
147 Susan Athey et al., Escaping from Government and Corporate Surveillance. Evidence
from the MIT Digital Currency Experiment, FTC 1 (Oct. 3, 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2016/10/00071-129190.pdf.
148 Penny Crosman, Can Banks Protect Against the Threat of Everyday Devices?, AM.
BANKER (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/bank-technology/canbanks-protect-against-the-threat-of-everyday-devices-1092148-1.html (quoting Austin Berglas, head of cyber defense at the consulting firm K2 Intelligence and former head of the
FBI’s New York cyber branch).
149 See id.
150 See id.
151 See id (acknowledging that “[p]eople have become a little too cavalier about internetconnected devices.”).
152 See David E. Sanger & Nicole Perloth, A New Era of Internet Attacks Powered by
Everyday
Devices,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
22,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/us/politics/a-new-era-of-internet-attacks-powered-byeveryday-devices.html (discussing new malware that exploits vulnerabilities in cameras and
other cheap devices).
153 See Jane Wild, Central banks explore blockchain to create digital currencies, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/f15d3ab6-750d-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a
(recognizing that as worldwide central bank experimentation with blockchain progresses,
cross-border cooperation will be necessary to address regulating developments in digital
currency).
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B. How Will Blockchain Technology Change Financial Institutions
The FinTech competition to incorporate distributed ledger technology into
the financial services industry has gone global. To date, the greatest challenge
that FinTech companies face in developing what will comprise the new core of
the blockchain banking industry is developing a ledger that properly154 balances
transparency to financial markets with protecting consumers’ financial and
identity information.155 In attempting to achieve this balance, the crux of the
competition, that divides FinTech and blockchain banking initiatives156 alike, is
whether the best interests of the industry will be served/achieved through a
permissionless, distributed public ledger or a permissioned, distributed private
ledger.157
Distinguishable from Bitcoin’s permissionless, or public, blockchain that
enables a universal market to access to all information, “permissioned,” or private, blockchains are those in which only known, trusted entities can participate.158 Through a permissioned distributed ledger, sensitive information would
never be published.159 It is highly likely that more financial institutions will opt
for a permissioned distributed ledger that will limit the sharing of information
154 See JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES 87
(2009) (explaining the efficient market theory and monetary policy).
155 The notable banking blockchain competitors include R3, Symbiont, Digital Asset
Holdings, and CitiGroup. Compare Digital Asset Holdings’ private distributed ledger model
which is anchored in a “need-to know” basis model (“Shared ledgers should contain the bare
minimum information, interpretable only by those with a need and right to know, to permit
notification, synchronization and confirmation.”) with Symbiont. Tanaya Macheel, Banks’
Privacy Concerns Shaping Blockchain Vendors’ Strategies, AM. BANKER (July 26, 2016),
http://www.americanbanker.com/news/bank-technology/banks-privacy-concerns-shapingblockchain-vendors-strategies-1090411-1.html.
156 As an open source innovation for financial disintermediation, the Bitcoin blockchain
was designed with an “all or nothing” approach to transact, validate and access transactions
publically. The sensitive information should never be published; some say all data should be
published, even if some of it must be concealed. Addleshaw Goddard LLP, Blockchain –
Public
or
Private,
LEXOLOGY
(Nov.
17,
2016),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a381bb8a-3494-4f8d-9655-7f469cfddb23.
157 See Gideon Greenspan, Payment and Exchange Transactions in Shared Ledgers, 10
J. PAYMENTS STRATEGY & SYS. 172, 172-77 (2016) (identifying what characteristics distinguish distributed ledgers from centralized ledgers, as well as Bitcoin-style blockchain from
Etherum-style blockchain).
158 For a more technical understanding of the difference between permissioned and permissionless ledgers, see TIM SWANSON, CONSENSUS-AS-A-SERVICE: A BRIEF REPORT ON THE
EMERGENCE OF PERMISSIONED,
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER SYSTEMS 5 (2015).
159 See Tanaya Macheel, Banks’ Privacy Concerns Shaping Blockchain Vendors’ Strategies,
AM.
BANKER
(July
26,
2016),
http://www.americanbanker.com/news/banktechnology/banks-privacy-concerns-shaping-blockchain-vendors-strategies-1090411-1.html
(recognizing consumer confidentiality concerns).
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with the parties on a need-to-know basis while improving upon the quality of
the consumer, business, or regulatory relationship. As financial institutions
incorporate distributed ledger technology, a balance must be struck between
maximizing efficiency and minimizing transaction costs, without sacrificing
market stability, and consumer protection must take into consideration how
cybersecurity risks will be mitigated.160
C. Advantages of Incorporating Blockchain Technology in Banks
The primary characteristics of distributed ledger technology are its immutability, transparency, and autonomy.161 The autonomous execution capabilities
of blockchain technology – both FinTech and regulatory technology (“RegTech”) would enable compartmentalized access to financial information that
provides immutable and real-time updates that facilitate automated review.
Blockchain technologies have the potential to transform financial and industrial markets, challenge corporate boundaries,162 and add transparency to the public sector.163 The benefits of blockchain technology include reduction in transaction costs, 164 increase in regulatory compliance, instantaneous settlement,

160 See Max N. Helveston, Consumer Protection in the Age of Big Data, 93 WASH. U. L.
REV. 859, 873-74 (2016) (discussing how the Big Data movement increases the risk to consumer personal information, either through intentional sharing with insufficient privacy
protections for individual information or the data-possessing entity’s failure to implement
safeguards that would prevent a third-party breach of information); see also Justin Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 355,
356-57 (2015) (detailing how the weak legal privacy protections afforded to consumers in
the United States requires consumer initiative to protect their data).
161 Disruptive innovation in financial services: A Blueprint for Digital Identity, WORLD
ECON.
F.
60
(Aug.
12,
2016),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_A_Blueprint_for_Digital_Identity.pdf.
162 See e.g., The Great Chain of Being Sure About Things, ECONOMIST (Oct. 31 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21677228-technology-behind-bitcoin-lets-peoplewho-do-not-know-or-trust-each-other-build-dependable (“Ledgers that no longer need to be
maintained by a company—or a government—may in time spur new changes in how companies and governments work, in what is expected of them and in what can be done without
them”).
163 Bitcoin 2.0 Protocol Projects include: Ripple (gateway, payment, exchange, remittance network, smart contract system); Counterparty (overlay protocol for currency issuance
and exchange); Mastercoin (financial derivatives); NXT (altcoin mined with proof of stake
consensus model); BitShares (decentralized crypto-equity share exchange); Colored Coins
(Bitcoin assert marking for digital/physical assets). MELANIE SWAN, BLOCKCHAIN: BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW ECONOMY 18 (Tim McGovern eds., 2015).
164 See Nicole Bullock, Blockchain starts transition from hype to everyday use in markets, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/08d54cdc-74e2-11e6-bf48b372cdb1043a (discussing how costs such as cross-border payments, securities trading, and
regulatory compliance charges could be reduced by technology).
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increased security,165 and streamlined international trade finance through global
interoperability.166 To date, the areas in which DLT is thought to be most impactful include the financial markets in payments, banking, securities settlement,167 and the trade of digital and financial assets.168 Accordingly, the advantages of incorporating blockchain technology as it applies to regulatory
compliance functions include: compliance software that utilizes artificial intelligence to monitor trading activity by automatically learning patterns to detect
illegal activity; recording derivative trades; monitoring the risk national banks
are exposed; and programming mobile applications to notify and report suspicious account activity to bank managers in real-time.169 As a consequence, traditional legacy banks will experience fundamental shifts in their organizational
boundaries, with many transactions currently governed through hierarchy, relational contracting, or market transactions that will shift to the blockchain as an
outworking of economic efficiency over transaction costs.170
The political economy of blockchains challenges the legacy of banking, financial organizations, and market structure. Blockchains are apt to outcompete
hierarchical organizations such as banks, and relational market contracting,
which are transactions requiring trust.171 Therefore, the redistribution of value
amongst financial institutions that have or have not adapted to DLT will be
inevitable, and consequently, will warrant the recalibration of banking as an
institution.172 To date, a majority of financial institutions that are at the forefront of the global financial technological revolution are those Too-Big-ToMiss-Out – either, they were recognized as institutionally worthy enough to
join a consortium or were capable of financing their own in-house FinTech
TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 38, at 71.
Id.
167 See Stan Higgins, 8 R3 Banks Test Intel Blockchain Platform, COINDESK (Sept. 26,
2016), http://www.coindesk.com/8-r3-banks-test-intel-blockchain-platform/ (discussing how
banks took part in blockchain technology tests performed by Intel); see also Michael
Mainelli & Alistair Milne, The Impact and Potential of Blockchain on Securities Transaction Lifecycle 4 (SWIFT Inst., Working Paper No. 2015-007, 2016) (explaining how Bitcoin
blockchain is being compared to complex messaging in securities settlements).
168 See MELANIE SWAN, BLOCKCHAIN: BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW ECONOMY 15 (2015),
http://w2.blockchain-tec.net/blockchain/blockchain-by-melanie-swan.pdf
(“Blockchain
based smart property contemplates the possibility of widespread decentralized trustless asset
management systems as well as cryptographically activated assets.”); see also SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 97, at 91 (explaining that centralized institutions “increase costs, freezes
innovative potential, and needs layers of reconciliation.” Adam Ludwin, CEO of Chain
identified blockchain at the “new database technology, purpose-built for trading assets.”).
169 DIANA C. BIGGS, HOW NON-BANKS ARE BOOSTING FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND REMITTANCE, in BANKING BEYOND BANKS AND MONEY: A GUIDE TO BANKING SERVICES IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 190 (Paolo Tasca et al. eds., 2016).
170 MACDONALD ET AL, supra note 111, at 279.
171 Id.
172 Id.
165
166
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experimentation.
Regardless of whether financial institutions adopt a permissioned or permissionless distributed ledger, a shared repository with real-time access to data
will facilitate transparency between regulators and regulated entities.173 Reporting activities through smart contracts will enable the automation of compliance
activities. In conclusion, the characteristics distributed ledger technology allows for the adaptability to a rapidly changing marketplace demands and enables efficient responsiveness to and growing regulatory constraints.
PART III: REGULATION
“You will not find a solution to political problems in cryptography.”174
A. History of Federal Regulation of Digital Currencies, Money Service
Businesses, and Money Transmission in the United States
Regulators have chosen to regulate cryptocurrency businesses under the
payments regulatory framework.175 Accordingly, the current regulatory approach to decentralized virtual currencies mirrors that of financial regulation in
general, a hybrid of “ex ante and ex post regulation to mitigate systemic risk in
the financial system.”176 This Section will outline the current regulations of
virtual currency, the absence of legislation addressing distributed ledger technology, and the effect proposed cybersecurity standards will have on the future
of global financial technology.
To date, the Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (“FinCEN”) and the New York Department of Financial Services
(“NYDFS”) are the most notable examples of virtual currency proactive regulation. Under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA),177 banks and other financial institutions are subject to various registration and recordkeeping requirements.178 The
Department of the Treasury requires all “money service businesses” to register
173 A Blueprint for Digital Identity The Role of Financial Institution in Building Digital
Identity,
WORLD
ECON.
F.
91
(Aug.
12,
2016),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_A_Blueprint_for_Digital_Identity.pdf.
174 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 38, at 263.
175 Joshua A.T. Fairfield, BitProperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 831 (2015).
176 Carla L. Reyes, Article, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 211
(2016).
177 Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951–59 (2012).
178 Courtney J. Linn, Redefining the Bank Secrecy Act: Currency Reporting and the
Crime of Structuring, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 407, 412–21 (2010) (describing the recordkeeping requirements of banks and other “money transmitters”).
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and develop both anti-money-laundering and customer identification programs.
In March 2013, FinCen issued guidance on the application of the Bank Secrecy
Act and its implementing regulations to virtual currencies (“Virtual Currency
Guidance”).179
The Virtual Currency Guidance outlines the applicability of the existing federal anti-money laundering (AML) regime to convertible virtual currencies and
includes decentralized virtual currencies. Virtual Currency Guidance thereby
declared that “exchangers”180 and “administrators”181 of such currencies are
subject to the AML requirements to the extent that they transmit decentralized
virtual currency or legal tender from one user to another, or from one location
to another.182 Additionally, it concluded that although a “virtual currency”
would not be deemed a “currency” under regulations implementing the BSA,
certain virtual currency businesses would nevertheless be money transmitters
under the BSA, subject to regulation as money services businesses (“MSB”).183
In 2014, FinCen attempted to clarify how the Virtual Currency Guidance applied to different decentralized technology business models and issued administrative guidance to address the regulation of virtual currency miners,184 soft179 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS
TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 5 (2013).
180 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2013-G001, GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S
REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 2

(Mar. 18, 2013) (“An exchanger is a person engaged as a business in the exchange of virtual
currency for real currency, funds, or other virtual currency.”).
181 Id. at 2 (“An administrator is a person engaged as a business in issuing (putting into
circulation) a virtual currency, and who has the authority to redeem (to withdraw from circulation) such virtual currency.”).
182 Id. at 4.
183 In re Coinflip, Inc. d/b/a Derividan, and Francisco Riordan, CFTC Docket No. 15-29,
at 2 n.2, Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity
Exchange Act, Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions, (Sept. 17, 2015); For
other definitions of virtual currency, see U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2013-G001, GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING,
OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 1 (Mar. 18, 2013) (defining “virtual currency” as “a medium of exchange that operates like a currency in some environments, but does not have all
the attributes of real currency”); 23 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 200.2 (2015) (defining
“virtual currency” as “any type of digital unit that is used as a medium of exchange or a
form of digitally stored value. Virtual Currency shall be broadly construed to include digital
units of exchange that (i) have a centralized repository or administrator; (ii) are decentralized and have no centralized repository or administrator; or (iii) may be created or obtained
by computing or manufacturing effort.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2013G001, GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING,
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 1 (Mar. 18, 2013) (quoting 31 C.F.R. §
1010.100(m), which defines “real currency” as “the coin and paper money of the United
States or of any other country that (i) is designated as legal tender and that (ii) circulates and
(iii) is customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the country of issuance.”).
184 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2014-R007, GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF MONEY
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ware development and investment activities,185 virtual currency trading platforms, 186 and virtual currency payment systems.187 Despite FinCen’s numerous
attempts to provide clarity in the scope of its guidance through administrative
rulings, the significant risk of harm posed by ongoing issues vagueness and a
lack of clarity is particularly problematic in the arena of digital currency innovations; the USA Patriot Act made noncompliance with state money license
rules a federal crime whether or not a business is aware of the violation.188
In June 2015, NYDFS promulgated its final “BitLicense” framework for
regulating “virtual currency businesses.”189 Under NYDFS’s BitLicense
framework, “virtual currency business activities” are categorized into five major prongs: (1) transmitting virtual currency;190 (2) holding virtual currency on
behalf of others; (3) buying and selling virtual currency as a customer business; (4) providing exchange services as a customer business; and (5) controlling, administering, or issuing virtual currency.191 Distinguishable from
NYDFS’s strict BitLicense regime, North Carolina is the only state that has
proposed a bill that would adopt a lenient, regulatory sandbox approach to
money transmitter licensing.192
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was established by the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act).193 FSOC’s 2016 Annual Report acknowledged that “a considerable degree of coordination among regulators may be required to effectively identify
SERVICES BUSINESS REGULATIONS TO THE RENTAL OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS FOR MINING VIRTUAL CURRENCY 3 (Apr. 29, 2014).
185 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2014-R011, GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S
REGULATIONS TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND CERTAIN INVESTMENT
ACTIVITY 2-3 (Jan. 30, 2014).
186 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2014-R011, REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RULING ON THE APPLICATION OF FINCEN REGULATIONS TO A VIRTUAL CURRENCY TRADING PLATFORM 2-3 (Oct. 27, 2014).
187 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2013-G001, GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 2-3 (Oct. 27, 2014).
188 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001).
189 23 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 200.2(p) (2015).
190 23 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 200.02(o) (2015) (defining “transmitting virtual
currency” as “the transfer, by or through a third party, of Virtual Currency from a Person to
a Person.”).
191 23 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 200.02(q)(1)–(5) (2015).
192 H.B. 289, 2016-17 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2015).
193 See Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” In Financial Stability Oversight
Council, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 1087, 1088 (2015) (arguing that “both the FSOC’s structure and
its mandate are flawed in ways that increase the susceptibility of financial stability regulation to the vagaries of political economy.”).
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and address risks associated with distributed ledger systems.” 194 FSOC is the
only agency that has a mandate to “identify risks to the financial stability of the
United States” and to “respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial system.”195 Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the mandate
is reduced because Dodd-Frank does not provide definition for the term “financial stability.”
B. The Repercussions of Deficient Regulatory Action Towards Blockchain
Technology
Present alternative regulatory proposals primarily focus on “ex ante
measures followed by ex post supplemental enforcement actions as necessary.”196 Financial globalization establishes a “regulator[y] dilemma” for regulators who would like to benefit from international exchange but are wary of
compromising their financial systems.197 Accordingly, there is a gap in current
distributed ledger technology policy recommendations between the policy concerns presently voiced by regulators and the frustration of many decentralized
industry participants who want a limited national FinTechs charter.
Businesses that have monetary transmission licenses that even remotely engage with distributed ledger technology are potentially subject to federal
monetary, anti-money laundering, investment, and consumer protection regimes, in addition to any of the 50 different state money transmitter licensing
regimes198 in which their businesses engage. Federal authorities’ policy priorities have shifted from a concentrated focus on money-laundering, terrorist financing, and identity verification towards a more complex payments-related
issues, including privacy and security, tax compliance, and the potential for use
of unfair and deceptive businesses practices in the industry.”199 State regulatory
activity also added new policy concerns to the mix, with a primary focus on
consumer protection.200
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 127 (2016).
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5301.
196 Reyes, supra note 176, at 221 (highlighting the “overwhelming[] emphasis on the
payments applications of decentralized ledger technologies, curbing illicit uses of such
payments applications, reducing the perceived extreme level of anonymity afforded to use
of such payments applications, [and] protecting consumers from financial loss.”).
197 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address
the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 100–01 (2013).
198 See generally CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, MODEL STATE CONSUMER AND
INVESTOR
GUIDANCE
ON
VIRTUAL
CURRENCY
3
(Apr.
23,
2014),
https://www.csbs.org/legislative/testimony/Documents/ModelConsumerGuidance—
Virtual%20Currencies.pdf. See Reyes, supra note 176, 208 n. 96 (identifying the ten states
that have released consumer guidance in accordance with the CSBS model).
199 Reyes, supra note 176, at 210.
200 Id.
194
195
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Therefore, the Uniform Law Commission is working to draft the Virtual
Currency Businesses Act. 201 The Commission stated mission is to “harmonize”
state-level regulation of virtual currencies “[i]n the absence of an overarching
federal payments regulatory framework.”202 Due to the lack of clarity in FinCen
digital currency regulations as it applies to distributed ledger technology, digital asset companies involved in MSB activities are being denied access to
banking services without appropriate initial due diligence oriented towards
understanding the actual business model.203 As a result of anti-money laundering, terrorist financing, and potential use for illicit-purposes risks that virtual
currencies pose,204 licensed money transmitters 205 are fearful that activities associated with blockchain distributed ledger technology will threaten their licenses and relationships with regulators. Besides being subject to disjointed
federal and state money transmission and money services business regimes,206
entities engaged in transmitting money likely must comply with OFAC requirements,207 consumer protection obligations, as well as the CFPB’s Remittance Rule.208
The trajectory of federal regulation of decentralized virtual currency is
marked by an emphasis on ex ante attempts to prevent financial harm and ex
post prosecutions of harmful activity that are a consequence of the former regulations’ incongruity with newly emerging technological applications.209 This
has resulted in a financial technology “law lag,” which refers to the circumstances in which “existing legal provisions are inadequate to deal with a social,
cultural or commercial context created by rapid advances in information and
communication technology . . . .”210 By falling behind in the global financial
201 See generally NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON
TUAL CURRENCIES ACT (draft), 6 (2015).

UNIF. STATE LAWS, REGULATION OF VIR-

202 Regulation
of Virtual Currencies, UNIF. L. COMM’N (Feb. 9, 2017),
http://www.uniformlawcommission.com/Committee.aspx?title=Regulation%20of%20Virtua
l%20Currencies.
203 See PRATIN V ALLABHANENI ET AL., OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO BANKING VIRTUAL
CURRENCY BUSINESSES, COIN CENTER REPORT 11 (May 2016).
204 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: KEY DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL AML/CFT RISKS, 3 (June 2014).
205 John L. Douglas, New Wine into Old Bottles: Fintech Meets the Bank Regulatory
World, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 17, 43 (Mar. 1, 2016).
206 Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5330 (2012).
207 JAMES SIVON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FINTECH AND BANKING LAW: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE 63 (2014).
208 Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 1005 (2012).
209 Reyes, supra note 176, at 212.
210 Jeremy Pitt & Ada Diaconescu, The Algorithmic Governance of Common-Pool
Resources, in FROM BITCOIN TO BURNING MAN AND BEYOND: THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY
AND AUTONOMY IN A DIGITAL SOCIETY 130, 137–38 (John H. Clippinger & David Bollier
eds., 2014).
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technological revolution, overly broad regulations and vague administrative
guidance that do not directly address blockchain technology stifle innovation,
and economic growth will decrease financial institutional capabilities to combat cybersecurity threats.211 The OCC, CFTC, and SEC have been consistent in
their acknowledgement of the potential of distributed ledger technology, their
encouragement for collaboration between regulated financial institutions, and
expression of caution to the operational and systematic risks posed by the new
technology.212
In conclusion, a lack of uniformity between states’ often vague and conflicting AML/BSA regimes, and the absence of a national limited FinTechs charter,
have effectively stopped collaborative efforts between FinTechs and financial
institutions. The absence of a national charter therefore jeopardizes American
institutions’ relevance in the development of the future global financial system
by creating an environment that is inhospitable to innovators. Given the absence of any incentives for banks to collaborate with FinTechs, it is arguable
that there will be an increase in cybersecurity threats posed to financial institutions who do not update their cyber risk protocol. Thus, financial stability will
not be attained under current virtual currency regulations and in turn, threatens
the privacy of financial and personal identifiable information.
C. Comparing International Regulatory Actions Towards Payment Innovation
With the increased use of technology within the financial services industry,
regulatory bodies have the opportunity to access a level of granularity in risk
assessments that did not previously exist. The autonomous, self-sufficient, and
decentralized nature of blockchain technology suggests that a rule-based, as
opposed to principle-based, approach to regulation is better suited for blockchain technology because it would be difficult for computers to understand the
nuances and spirit of the laws in which the rules have been promulgated.213
FinTech firms have suggested that the OCC create a limited purpose FinTechs
charter 214 that resembles the principles-based regulation of the United King211 Hillary J. Allen, $=€=Bitcoin?, SUFFOLK U. LAW SCHOOL RESEARCH PAPER NO. 1533 (May 18, 2016); Reyes, supra note 176, at 211.
212 Mary Jo White, Chairman, SEC, Opening Statements at the Fintech Forum (Nov. 14,
2016); Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks at the Chatham House ‘City
Series’ Conference, “The Banking Revolution: Innovation, Regulation and Consumer
Choice (Nov. 3, 2016).
213 See JANOS BARBERIS AND DOUGLAS W. ARNER., FINTECH IN CHINA: FROM SHADOW
BANKING TO P2P LENDING, in BANKING BEYOND BANKS AND MONEY 89-90 (Paolo Tasca et
al. eds., 2016).
214 Lalita Clozel, Fintech firms press OCC for specialized charter, BLOOMBERG (June 16,
2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/enterprise/blog/fintech-firms-press-occ-for-specializedcharter/.
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dom and Japan that would provide FinTechs with a “passport” across several
states.215 The OCC could create a risk-mitigating limited federal charter for
FinTech firms which only authorizes FinTech firms to engage in some of the
core activities of banks.216 Specifically, FinTech firms would possess the benefits of federal regulation, preemption of state law, and access to the payments
system, but would not participate in risk-generating activities.217
The United Kingdom’s financial regulatory system consists of the U.K.’s
Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”), Prudential Regulation Authority
(“PRA”) and HM Treasury.218 In May 2016, the FCA launched Project Innovate, a regulatory sandbox for market entrants and incumbent financial institutions for the purpose of promoting competition through disruptive innovation
to foster innovation in the U.K. financial services market.219 As a result of the
U.K.’s principle-based approach to regulating payment innovations, it has experienced burgeoning success with payments experimentation and is “lightyears ahead” of the United States in providing licensing options.220 In contrast
with the United States’ state-by-state licensing regime, the European Union
provides members with “passport regulation” which provides FinTech firms
with licenses to make digital transfers across borders.221 The eligibility criteria
include the firm’s activity intent to be within the scope of FCA regulations,
genuinely innovative product or service that provides a consumer benefit, genuine need for the sandbox, and preparedness for testing in a live environment.222 The U.K. has four levels of licensing for nonbank payments providers

215 See e.g., Telis Demos, Brexit Leaves Europe’s fintech Firms in the Lurch, WALL. ST.
J. (June 27, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/brexit-leaves-europes-fintech-firms-in-thelurch-1467019802 (recognizing that if a FinTech firm is regulated in the United Kingdom’s
FCA, it is regulated across the European Union).
216 Peter Van Valkenburgh & Jerry Brito, Comments to the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency on Supporting Responsible Innovation (May 27, 2016).
217 Id.
218 CHARTERED INS. INST., POLICY BRIEFING: THE UK’S NEW FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY
LANDSCAPE
2
(Apr.
2013),
http://www.cii.co.uk/media/4372607/regulatory_landscape_update_april_2013_vfonline.pdf
.
219 Alex Davis, FCA Launches ‘Regulatory Sandbox’ For Financial Products, LAW360
(May 9, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/793933/fca-launches-regulatory-sandboxfor-financial-products.
220 Telis Demos, Brexit Leaves Europe’s fintech Firms in the Lurch, WALL. ST. J. (June
27, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/brexit-leaves-europes-fintech-firms-in-the-lurch1467019802.
221 See e.g., id. (recognizing that if a FinTech firm is regulated in the United Kingdom’s
FCA, it is regulated across the European Union).
222 Regulatory
Sandbox,
FINANCIAL
CONDUCT
AUTHORITY,
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/project-innovate-innovation-hub/regulatory-sandbox
(last
updated Nov. 21, 2016).
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which adapt to the characteristics and business models of the requesting entity:
(1) E-Money Institutions (“EMI”), (2) small EMI licenses, (3) Authorized
Payment Institutions (“API”), and (4) small API licenses.223
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), released a white paper in March 2016 entitled “Supporting Responsible Innovation in the Federal
Banking System.”224 In its paper, the OCC extended its support for innovation
in the financial services industry that it views as “consistent with safety and
soundness, compliant with applicable laws and regulations, and protective of
consumer’s rights.”225 Additionally, it emphasizes the need to “support responsible innovation”226 and business cultures “receptive to responsible innovation.”227 In October 2016, the OCC issued that, as a part of its responsible innovation framework, it will establish the Office of Innovation to facilitate regulatory interagency coordination and serve as a technical assistance program for
banks and non-banks.228 To date, the OCC has not yet decided to grant a national FinTech charter. However, Commissioner Thomas J. Curry of the OCC
remarked in November 2016 that “if the OCC decides to grant a national charter …, the institution will be held to the same high standards of safety, soundness, and fairness that other federally chartered institutions must meet.”229 The
Commissioner recognized that opposition to a limited purpose FinTech charter
includes dispute over the scope of the charter, Congress being the more appropriate vessel to enact the charter, and concerns that states will be preempted
from providing individualistic protections to its consumers. 230 Correspondingly, Commissioner Curry asserted that while the OCC does have the authority to
223 Judith Rinearson, U.S. Regulators Losing Out to U.K., EU on Innovation, AMERICAN BANKER (Dec. 28, 2015), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/us-regulatorslosing-out-to-uk-eu-on-innovation.
224 OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION
IN
THE
FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM: AN OCC PERSPECTIVE 5 (2016),
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publicationsbytype/otherpublicationsreports/pubresponsibl
einnovationbankingsystemoccperspective.pdf.
225 Id.
226 In to describe this process of using new or improved products, services, and processes
to meet the evolving needs of consumers, businesses, and communities in a way that is safe,
sound, and fair, and aligned with banks’ strategies.
227 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION IN THE FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM: AN OCC PERSPECTIVE 2 (2016),
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publicationsbytype/otherpublicationsreports/pubresponsibl
einnovationbankingsystemoccperspective.pdf.
228 Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Issues Responsible
Innovation Framework,
(Oct. 26, 2016) (on file with author).
229 Thomas J. Curry, Commissioner, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks at the Chatham House ‘City Series’ Conference, “The Banking Revolution: Innovation, Regulation and
Consumer Choice,” (Nov. 3, 2016).
230 Id.
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issue a charter to companies that engage in at least one of three core banking
functions—taking deposits, paying checks, or lending money – the OCC has
never waived consumer protection compliance requirements because it does
not have the authority to do so.
D. The Feasibility of a FinTech Federal Charter
The United States could substantially benefit from adopting a principlesbased approach like the United Kingdom, especially considering recent regulatory developments that address the concerns addressed by opponents of the
federal FinTech charter. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council (“FFIEC”) issued guidance regarding the risks and risk management
practices that apply to the use of free and open source software (“FOSS”).231
The main risks that regulators identified include multiple risk management
areas, including code customization, IT architecture, forking, systems integration and support, and legal risks.232 On October 25, 2016, FinCen released an
advisory to assist financial institutions in understanding their BSA obligations
regarding cyber-events and cyber-enabled crime.233 FinCen does not require
financial institutions to report egregious, significant, or damaging cyber-events
and cyber-enabled crime when such events and crime do not otherwise require
the filing of a suspicious activity report (SAR).234 The guidance encouraged
reporting SARs, collaboration between BSA/AML compliance and cybersecurity risk units, and the sharing of information between financial institutions to
combat money laundering, terrorist financing and cyber-enabled crime.235
Banks’ information governance relates to data safeguards,236 record-keeping
231 FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, FIL-114-2004, Guidance on Risk Management of Free and Open Source Software (Oct. 21, 2004).
232 Id.
233 FINCEN, FIN-2016-A005, Advisory to Financial Institutions on Cyber-Events and
Cyber0Enabled Crime (Oct. 25, 2016).
234 Id.
235 Id (identifying a “cyber-event” as [a]n attempt to compromise or gain unauthorized
electronic access to electronic systems, services, resources, or information” and a “cyberenabled crime” as “[i]llegal activities (e.g., fraud, money laundering, identity theft) carried
out or facilitated by electronic systems and devices, such as networks and computers).
236 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) applies to all financial institutions and governs the use, storage, and protection of personally identifiable information. Gramm-LeachBailey Act Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, (codified in relevant part at 15 U.S.C. § § 68016809 and §§ 6821-6837). Personally identifiable information is defined as: Any information
about an individual maintained by an agency, including (1) any information that can be used
to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as name, social security number, date
and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric records; and (2) any other information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical, educational, financial,
and employment information; ERIKA MCCALLISTER ET AL., NIST GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE
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requirements, and breaches of security information.237 While a financial institution may outsource the function to a service provider, it is unable to outsource
its responsibility for compliance.238 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,239 and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, have harmonized the principles articulated in
the aforementioned FFIEC and FinCen releases, and proposed joint standards
for enhanced cyber risk management standards for large and interconnected
entities under their supervision and those entities’ service providers. 240 The
enhanced cyber risk management standards described in the ANPR would apply on an enterprise-wide basis to banking organizations and financial institutions with US$50 billion or more in total consolidated assets.
As technology dependence in the financial sector continues to grow, so do
opportunities for high-impact technology failures and cyber-attacks. Due to the
interconnectedness of the U.S. financial system, a cyber incident or failure of
one entity may result in systemic consequences involving related entities.241
The agencies are considering implementing the enhanced standards in a tiered
manner to imposing more stringent standards on the systems of those entities
that are critical to the functioning of the financial sector. The proposed rule
addresses five categories of cyber standards: cyber risk governance; cyber risk
management; internal dependency management; external dependency management; and incident response, cyber resilience and situational awareness.242
CONCLUSION
Distributed ledger technology will have the most disruptive impact on the
financial services industry since the invention of the Internet. Banking consorCONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII) B1, ES-1 (2010).
237 See FED. DEPOSIT CORP. INS., FIL-121-2004, GUIDANCE ON DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE COMPUTER SOFTWARE EVALUATION PROGRAM TO ENSURE QUALITY AND REGULATORY
COMPLIANCE 2 (Nov. 16, 2004);
FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, FIL-114-2004, GUIDANCE ON RISK MANAGEMENT OF
FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 1 (Oct. 21, 2004).
238 See KEVIN C. TAYLOR, FINTECH LAW: A GUIDE TO TECHNOLOGY LAW IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 8-8, (2014).
239 The OCC is the primary regulator of banks chartered under the National Bank Act, 12
USC § 1 et seq. and federal savings associations chartered under the Home Owners Loan
Act of 1933, 12 USC § 1461 et seq.
240 12 C.F.R. §30. The regulations governing banking operations enforced by the U.S.
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency provide legal authorization for national banks to
use electronic systems, including computer networks, to conduct their banking services.
241 12 C.F.R. §30. The regulations governing banking operations enforced by the U.S.
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency provide legal authorization for national banks to
use electronic systems, including computer networks, to conduct their banking services.
242 12 C.F.R. §30.
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tiums’ experimentation, development, and adoption of distributed ledger technology will substantially alter the intermediary roles of banks. Regulatory emphasis on the threat posed by virtual currencies, like bitcoin, has created an
environment that is inhospitable to innovation. For the full potential of blockchain technology to become a reality, the OCC must create a limited national
charter for FinTechs. Whether or not distributed ledger technology is endorsed
within the next year or the next decade, the United States’ participation in the
global financial technology revolution warrants increased cybersecurity risk
management standards.

